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When Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended in 1983, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
sought to remedy the failure of the previous rule to effectively
deter abuses of pleadings and other papers.' The text of Rule
11 was therefore changed from requiring a subjective inquiry
of the signer's "good faith" to an objective test focusing on the
reasonableness of the inquiry behind the pleading or other
paper.2 While the previous rule did not address the application
* B.A. 1988, Whitman College; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Puget Sound
School of Law.
1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
2. The following constitutes a compilation of the old language and the revised
language of Rule 11. The portions of Rule 11 that were deleted are in bold type and
the additions to Rule 11 are underlined.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or
of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. or is signed with intent to defeat
the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may
be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to
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of Rule 11 to pro se litigants, the Advisory Committee included
specific language in the amended rule making pro se litigants
subject to Rule 11 sanctions.3
Cases brought by pro se litigants make up a significant
portion of the dockets of Federal District Courts.4 The vast
majority of pro se cases arise from pro se inmate claims, pro se
tax cases against the Internal Revenue Service, and pro se civil
rights plaintiffs.5 However, difficulties exist when a court is
faced with applying Rule 11 to such pro se litigants because pro
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Amendments to Rules, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). This is the text of Rule 11 at the time of
publication. Proposed amendments to Rule 11 were prepared by the Advisory Com-
mittee, approved by the Federal Judiciary Committee, and are currently before Con-
gress and the Supreme Court for approval.
3. Prior to 1983, Rule 11 addressed pro se litigants in that it provided: "A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading .... " See supra note 2.
However, old Rule 11 applied a certification requirement only to attorneys and did not
provide for the sanctioning of pro se litigants. See supra note 2. As stated in 5A
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1334 (2d Ed. 1990):
The purpose of requiring unrepresented parties to sign their pleadings was
not to place them under an obligation to investigate as thoroughly as would an
attorney whether there was reasonable grounds for the action. Rather, it was
to make certain that those named as parties in an action in which there was
no lawyer actually had assented to the filing of the action on their behalf.
In contrast, Rule 11 as amended in 1983 applies to pro se litigants because the lan-
guage of the rule provides as follows: "A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address."
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Thus, a pro se litigant is now subject to the certification require-
ment because Rule 11 provides that "[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, or motion, or other paper ... Id.
(emphasis added).
4. It is estimated that approximately 340 pro se lawsuits were filed in U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia in 1990. Catherine Toups, Sue-'em-all Strategy
Keeps Courts Busy, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at Al. Of those 340 lawsuits, none
were resolved in favor of the pro se plaintiff. Further, in 1988, pro se lawsuits
comprised approximately 16% of the dockets of the Federal District Courts in New
York State. Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association, Pro
Se Litigation in the Second Circuit, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 571, 572 (1988) [hereinafter
Committee on Federal Courts]. The court in Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F.Supp. 905,
911 (S.D. Tex. 1986), noted that there were over 200 pro se cases on that court's docket
in 1986. The court stated that "[m]ore and more of this Court's time is being consumed
by coping with frivolous pro se lawsuits." Id.
For a comprehensive study of the problems associated with pro se litigation, see
Michael J. Mueller, Abusive Pro Se Plaintiffs In The Federal Courts. Proposals For
Judicial Control, 18 UNIV. MICH. J.L. REF. 93 (1984) (discussing the problems arising in
federal courts as a result of "career" pro se plaintiffs).
5. Committee on Federal Courts, supra note 4, at 572.
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se litigants have no formal legal training.'
Sometimes courts are faced with cases where a pro se liti-
gant has filed a claim where the law is well-settled against the
pro se litigant.7 In some instances, the pro se litigant may have
researched the legal basis of the claim, but not grasped that
the claim is frivolous.' In other cases, the litigant files the
claim knowing that there is no basis in law.9 And in the most
obvious cases, the pro se litigant has filed the same claim more
than once1" or has filed several frivolous lawsuits that were
previously dismissed by the court."' Courts may confront any
or all of these situations when presented with claims filed by
pro se litigants.
Discrepancies exist, however, in how courts apply Rule 11
to pro se litigants. 2 Under a strict reading of the language,
6. One commentator argues that pro se litigants "lack the ability to determine by
means of precedent whether their claims are frivolous," and, therefore, cannot be held
to the same standard as attorneys when determining whether Rule 11 has been
violated. Eric J.R. Nichols, Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age of Rule 11
Sanctions, 67 TEX. L. REV. 351, 373 (1988). Thus, in terms of the language of Rule 11, a
pro se litigant, according to Nichols, is unable to determine if a claim is "warranted by
existing law." See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
7. See, e.g., Snyder v. I.R.S., 596 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (holding that it is
clearly established that wages are taxable income); Kadan v. Williams, No. 89 Civ. 3379
(SWK), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1990) (finding that the law is
well-settled that judges are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts); Vizvary v.
Vignati, 134 F.R.D. 28 (D.R.I. 1990) (establishing law that federal courts have no
jurisdiction over probate matters).
8. In King v. U.S. Dept. of Housing, No. 87 C 10487, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5693
(N.D. Ill. June 15, 1988), the court found that the plaintiff's unsigned complaint was
"totally incoherent" and that there was no claim "vaguely indicating that plaintiff
might be entitled to relief .... Id. at *1. Nevertheless, the court did not impose
sanctions because the plaintiff had conducted some research and put forth his "best
efforts." See also Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding sanctions for
frivolous lawsuit but reducing amount of sanction); Posner v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 713 F. Supp. 562 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing amended complaint, but not
imposing Rule 11 sanctions because plaintiff made a reasonable investigation).
9. The court in Dyson v. Sposeep, 637 F. Supp. 616, 622-23 (N.D. Ind. 1986), upheld
Rule 11 sanctions against a pro se plaintiff because his claim was completely frivolous
and because plaintiff was aware of the doctrine of judicial immunity that barred his
claim.
10. In Carroll v. Philadelphia, Nos. 87-0592, 87-6258, 88-1239, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11652 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1989), the court granted sanctions and dismissed the
plaintiff's civil rights complaint that was identical to a lawsuit filed by the same
plaintiff, and dismissed by the same judge, a year earlier.
11. Id. "Frivolous" lawsuits refer to those that are not well-grounded in law or
fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
12. In SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPImCAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 41-3
(Federal Judiciary Center 1985), the author reported a study of how federal district
court judges apply Rule 11 to pro se litigants. The judges consistently applied Rule 11
less stringently to pro se litigants than to attorneys based on the same set of facts.
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Rule 11 should apply equally to all parties including attorneys,
represented parties, and pro se litigants. In looking at cases
where Rule 11 sanctions have been sought against pro se liti-
gants, however, there are inconsistencies in how the rule is
applied. Some courts still look for evidence of subjective bad
faith, 3 even though the Advisory Committee Notes and
United States Supreme Court have stated that Rule ii involves
an objective test.'4 Other courts purport to apply an objective
test, but they consider pro se litigants' status and special cir-
cumstances when determining whether Rule 11 has been vio-
lated.' 5 Still other courts apply an objective test, but they do
This study, however, was not based on actual decisions. Rather, a panel of judges was
presented with a hypothetical factual scenario (based upon the facts of an actual case),
and the judges were asked whether they would impose Rule 11 sanctions.
Nevertheless, as noted in this Comment, the actual cases involving the application
of Rule 11 to pro se litigants demonstrate that there are discrepancies in the standards
applied by federal judges. See infra part II.
13. See Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding bad
faith and upholding sanctions because plaintiff repeatedly filed the same claim); Bell v.
Clancy, Civil No. 86-1350-GT(M) (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1986) (refusing to impose Rule 11
sanctions against pro se plaintiff because there was insufficient evidence of bad faith);
Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (concluding that Rule 11
has a subjective element, as well as objective elements, that must be considered when
determining reasonableness); Cooper v. Adair, No. CV-88-2272, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5089 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 1989) (requiring malice to be proven in order to find Rule 11
sanctions against pro se plaintiff).
14. See Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 922
(1991); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983). The Advisory
Committee states that "[t]he standard is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances," and that the standard is "more stringent than the original good-faith
formula .... Id. This Comment asserts that the standard of "reasonableness under
the circumstances" is not meant to include a lower standard for pro se litigants
because of a lack of formal legal training.
15. See, e.g., Booker v. Buckley, 810 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that pro se
status and lack of attorney advice are appropriate special circumstances in determining
if Rule 11 has been violated); Harris v. Heinrich, 919 F.2d 1515 (lth Cir. 1990) (stating
that pro se status must be considered to determine if pro se inmate's filing was
reasonable); Blume v. Leake, 618 F. Supp. 95 (D.C. Idaho 1985) (stating that pro se
litigants are given the "benefit of the doubt"); Reinert v. O'Brien, No. 92-C-5601, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16002, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1992) (refusing to sanction plaintiff
for a frivolous lawsuit because of plaintiff's pro se status and further stating that "pro
se parties shall be sanctioned under Rule 11 only after successive attempts to press a
wholly frivolous claim"); Lindsey v. Jansante, No. 92-CV-75459-DT, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17644 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 1992) (refusing to impose Rule 11 sanctions because
plaintiff appeared pro se); Loss v. Kipp, No. 1:91-CV-157, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8195
(W.D. Mich. June 11, 1991) (declining to impose Rule 11 sanctions because of plaintiff's
pro se status, even though plaintiff had filed seven lawsuits in the previous two years);
Kadan v. Williams, No. 89 Civ. 3379 (SWK), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
11, 1990) (requiring pro se status to be considered when determining whether it was
objectively reasonable to sign pleading); Vizvary v. Vignati, 134 F.R.D. 28 (D.R.I. 1990)
(holding plaintiff to standard of the "reasonable pro se litigant").
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not consider the status of a pro se litigant when determining if
Rule 11 has been violated. Rather, these courts treat all par-
ties alike and only consider a pro se litigant's status when
determining an appropriate sanction, not when determining
whether to sanction.' 6
There are several problems inherent in the lack of a
clear standard for the application of Rule 11 to pro se litigants.
First, pro se litigants cannot be certain of the conduct to which
they are expected to conform when courts use different stan-
dards. For instance, courts that look for subjective bad faith or
that consider pro se litigants' special circumstances when
determining if Rule 11 was violated generally treat pro se liti-
gants more leniently. 7 Second, judges have no clear standard
for evaluating the conduct of pro se litigants, which leads to
inconsistent application of Rule 11 sanctions. Third, party
opponents of pro se litigants cannot be certain of when it is
appropriate to pursue Rule 11 sanctions.
In addition, several policy concerns are raised with respect
to the application of Rule 11 to pro se litigants. First, there is
the concern of protecting the interests of parties who must face
pro se litigants and incur the time and expense of defending
potentially frivolous and vexatious claims.' 8  A second, but
related, concern is the cost in time and resources incurred by
the judicial system in adjudicating pro se litigants' claims."
The final concern is the application of Rule 11 in a manner
that will not have a chilling effect on pro se litigation and that
16. See Zegula v. U.S., No. 91-35134, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 2685, at * 5 (9th Cir.
Feb. 10, 1992) (stating that "the pro se status of a litigant is relevant to the choice of an
appropriate sanction"); Manuel v. East Palo Alto, Nos. 89-15896, 89-15897, 89-15963,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11156, at *5 (9th Cir. May 24, 1991) (stating that when
determining an appropriate sanction, the trial court may consider the fact that plaintiff
proceeded without counsel); Pawlowske v. Chrysler Corp., 623 F. Supp. 569, 572 n.3
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that discretion regarding the special circumstances of pro se
litigants is "exercised in determining what to award, not whether").
17. The court in King v. US. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., No. 87 C 10487, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5693 (N.D. 111. June 15, 1988), stated that "we are not inclined to
impose Rule 11 sanctions where, as here, it appears that the plaintiff simply lacks the
capacity to understand and conform to federal pleading requirements." Id. at *4.
18. In response to a frivolous lawsuit filed by a pro se litigant, the court in Elmore
v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1986), acknowledged the interests of the
defendants to be protected. Accordingly, the court stated: "The defendants in these
suits, many of whom are of modest means or indigent themselves, have a right not to
be harassed and burdened by frivolous litigation, and the Court has a duty to protect
them." Id. at 911.
19. In Emore, the court noted that "the problem of frivolous filings by pro se
litigants is not a minor one." Id.
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does not inhibit pro se litigants' meaningful access to the court
system.
This Comment addresses the application of Rule 11 sanc-
tions to pro se litigants and argues that based on the language
of Rule 11, the concerns expressed in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 11, and the primary goal of Rule 11 to deter abu-
sive pleadings, a single objective standard should be applied to
all parties-attorneys, represented parties, and pro se liti-
gants-to determine whether Rule 11 has been violated.
Under this single objective standard, a pro se litigant's lack of
legal representation should be considered only in determining
the severity of the sanction, not in determining whether Rule
11 has been violated.
Section I of this Comment evaluates the language of Rule
11 as amended in 1983 and the accompanying Advisory Com-
mittee Note. In Section II, the varying approaches that courts
have taken to the application of Rule 11 to pro se litigants are
examined through specific Rule 11 cases. Section III discusses
the rationale and arguments supporting the application of a
single objective test to pro se litigants. Finally, Section IV
examines how a single test should be applied to pro se litigants
and the proper standards that may factor into the adjudication
of a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against a pro se litigant.
I. RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES
Rule 1120 was amended in 198321 because experience with
20. See supra note 2 for full text of Rule 11.
21. Rule 11 is currently in the process of being amended again. The Advisory
Committee on the FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE has prepared a PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS]. The proposed amendments were approved by the federal Judicial
Conference of the United States and are currently being considered by Congress and
the United States Supreme Court. Marianne Lavelle, The Judicial Conference Would
Alter Rule 11, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1992, at 17. If approved, the PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
would take effect in December 1993. Id.
There are three major changes to Rule 11 in the PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. First,
the word "may" has been substituted for the word "shall," thus giving district court
judges the discretion whether to impose sanctions for Rule 11 violations. The proposed
amendments by the advisory committee retained the word "shall" from the 1983
amendments. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 137 F.R.D. at 76. However, the Federal
Judicial Committee approved the change to "may" in June 1992. Randall Samborn,
Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule 11, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1992, at 13.
Second, the proposed amendments specify that district court judges may consider
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the original version indicated that it was not deterring abusive
practices of pleadings and other motions.22 In fact, a study of
litigation activity between 1938 and 1976 revealed that Rule 11
motions were filed in only nineteen cases and that violations
were found in only eleven of those cases.23
Also considered by the Advisory Committee were several
areas of confusion. First, there was confusion as to the circum-
stances that would trigger disciplinary action under Rule 11.24
Second, there was confusion as to the standard of conduct
expected of those parties signing pleadings and motions.25
Finally, there was confusion as to the range of available and
appropriate sanctions.2"
In addressing these areas of confusion, the Advisory Com-
mittee sought to accomplish a number of goals. The primary
goal was to cure the abuses that were apparent under the
nonmonetary sanctions, in addition to the possibility of monetary sanctions, for Rule
11 violations. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 137 F.R.D. at 77.
Third, the proposed amendments include a "safe harbor" provision under which a
party seeking Rule 11 sanctions must serve the alleged offending party with a motion
for sanctions and describe the specific conduct alleged to violate Rule 11. The
offending party then has a 21 day "safe harbor" in which to withdraw the "challenged
claim, defense, request, demand, objection, contention, or argument." Id. at 76.
According to the Advisory Committee, these proposed amendments are "intended
to remedy the problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the
1983 revision of [Rule 11]." Id. at 77. Nevertheless, "[tihe rule retains the principle
that attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to the court to refrain from
conduct that frustrates the aims of [FRCP] 1." Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Moreover,
the Advisory Committee continues to recognize that the proposed amendments
"restate the provisions requiring attorneys and pro se litigants to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other
documents, and mandating sanctions for violations of these obligations." Id. (emphasis
added).
The proposed amendments to Rule 11, however, do not affect the basic premises of
Rule 11 that the signer must have made a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts
and that a pleading or other paper is not submitted for an improper purpose.
Accordingly, the arguments presented in this Comment will focus on the basic
standard set forth in the 1983 version of Rule 11 that is retained in the PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS.
22. Rule 11 was amended in 1983 along with FEDERAL RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
7, 16, and 26 "in response to widespread concern about frivolous litigation and pretrial
abuses that were perceived as contributing to the overburdening of the federal judicial
system." 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1331. Thus, the amendment of Rule 11
reflected a "deliberate effort to reduce delay and expense and to 'dam the flood of
litigation that [threatened] . . . to inundate the courts.'" Id.
23. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some
"Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1976).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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application, or lack thereof, of the original Rule 11.27 However,
the Advisory Committee also sought to reduce the demon-
strated reluctance of courts to apply Rule 11 by emphasizing
the responsibilities imposed on those persons signing pleadings
and other motions.28 By creating an objective inquiry, the
Advisory Committee hoped to create more concrete stan-
dards.29 Additionally, by stressing individual responsibility and
increasing the applicability of sanctions to a broader set of cir-
cumstances, the Advisory Committee sought to streamline the
litigation process and to reduce the number of frivolous
claims.30
To accomplish these goals, the amended rule places an
affirmative duty on the person signing the pleading or other
paper. Whereas the original version of Rule 11 focused on the
subjective intent of the signer, 1 the amended rule focuses on
27. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 states that "[g]reater attention by
the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when
appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the
litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses." Id
28. The Advisory Committee states:
Authority to [impose Rule 11 sanctions) has been made explicit in order to
overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene unless requested by
one of the parties. The detection and punishment of a violation of the signing
requirement, encouraged by the amended rule, is part of the court's
responsibility for securing the system's effective operation.
Id.
29. A problem found in the original Rule 11, indeterminacy of standards, is still
prevalent in the amended rule and is one reason for the proposed amendments to Rule
11. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States describes this problem as follows:
The conduct of lawyers and litigants is less likely to be influenced by a rule
that is unpredictable in application. There may also be a greater injustice
associated with a relatively indeterminate rule that gives rise to punitive
consequences. Indeterminacy can also increase occasional injustice, as where
sanctions reflect a bad relationship between the court and attorney or litigant.
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES, 131 F.R.D. 335, 349 (Aug. 1990).
30. The Advisory Committee states that "Itihe new language is intended to reduce
the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities of the
attorney and reinforcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions." FED. R. CIv.
P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983) (citation omitted). By focusing on
pleading and motion abuses, the Advisory Committee sought to "discourage dilatory or
abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous
claims or defenses." Id.
31. In the original language of Rule 11 the focus was on the signer's "intent to
defeat the purpose" of Rule 11, and courts looked for "wilful violation[s]." See supra
note 2 for text of the original Rule 11.
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the reasonableness of the signer's pre-filing inquiry.32 There-
fore, Rule 11 imposes a two-part certification requirement on
the signer of a pleading: (1) the signer must make a reasonable
pre-filing inquiry, and (2) the signer must not submit the
pleading or motion for an improper purpose.33
The reasonable inquiry requirement is broken down into
two aspects: facts and law. Under amended Rule 11, a party's
complaint must be "well-grounded in fact" and "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modi-
fication, or reversal of existing law ... ,,3' This inquiry is an
objective consideration of "reasonableness under the
circumstances."
35
The improper purpose prong of the Rule 11 inquiry
appears, on the surface, to require a subjective evaluation of
the signer's intent in filing a pleading or motion. However, the
improper purpose prong is properly evaluated under an objec-
tive test and may be proven by evidence of successive filings
and/or harassment.' The Advisory Committee intended these
objective tests to be more stringent than the original subjective
intent inquiry.37 The Advisory Committee also believed that
an objective standard would provide more definite criteria to
determine when Rule 11 is violated and it would allow a
greater range of circumstances to result in Rule 11 violations.
Finally, the Advisory Committee believed that the amended
rule would provide a stronger deterrent to the filing of
improper and abusive pleadings.'
II. RULE 11 IN APPLICATION
Courts have interpreted Rule 11 and its application to pro
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See supra note 2 for text of the amended Rule 11.
34. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
35. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983); see also ABA
Standards and Guidelines, 121 F.R.D. 101 (1988).
36. ABA Standards and Guidelines, 121 F.R.D. 101 (1988). Such instances arise
when a pro se litigant's filings amount to vexatious litigation. See, e.g., Procup v.
Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (pro se inmate filed 176 lawsuits); Sparrow v.
Reynolds, 646 F. Supp. 834 (D.D.C. 1986) (pro se filed eighteen complaints for
discrimination).
37. The Advisory Committee states that "[tlhis standard is more stringent than
the original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of
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se litigants differently. As illustrated below, these differing
approaches have led to inconsistent results.
A. Courts That Look For Subjective Bad Faith
In determining whether a pro se litigant has violated Rule
11, a small number of courts continue to look for evidence of
subjective bad faith." For instance, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York applied such a
standard in Cooper v. Adair.4 ° The plaintiff in Cooper had
made a request of the defendant, Associated Universities, to
use their facilities and valuable research equipment to conduct
experiments to prove that certain Nobel Prize-winning speed-
of-light physics experiments performed in 1955 were actually
based on fraudulent information.4 ' Associated Universities
sent a letter to the plaintiff denying his request.42 The plain-
tiff filed an action alleging that Associated Universities made
defamatory comments in the letter rejecting his request.4"
The plaintiff's defamation claim was dismissed for failing
to state a claim on which relief could be granted.44 The plain-
tiff subsequently filed an "omnibus motion" seeking the fol-
lowing relief: amendment of the district court's judgment; a
new trial; relief from the prior judgment; and, leave to file an
amended complaint to allege a claim for tortious interfer-
ence.45 In response, the defendants sought Rule 11 sanctions
for this motion.46 The district court denied all of plaintiff's
motions, including the motion to amend. The court found that
there were insufficient facts to support a claim for tortious
interference and that such a claim was essentially identical to
the plaintiff's initial claim.47
39. In Ballantine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.C. 1990), the court held
that Rule 11 requires an inquiry into the objective component of whether a party made
a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts, as well as a subjective element of improper
purpose. Id. at 121-22. The court then found that the plaintiff had made a reasonable
inquiry, but had acted in bad faith in filing his complaints. Id. See also Bell v. Clancy,
Civ. No. 86-1350-GT(M) (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1987) (finding that pro se plaintiffs had
attempted to avoid income tax liability for several years, but because they proceeded
pro se, Rule 11 sanctions were not applied where there was no evidence of bad faith).
40. No. CV-88-2272, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5089 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 1989).
41. Id. at *1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *2.
45. Cooper, No. CV-88-2272, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5089, at *2.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *5.
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The court, however, also denied defendants' motion for
Rule 11 sanctions.' In denying the motion, the court recog-
nized that it is permissible to sanction pro se litigants under
Rule 11, but the court stated that "such an application of the
rule requires a showing of malice.
49
Thus, although the Advisory Committee and Supreme
Court have indicated that Rule 11 was amended to provide
more concrete objective criteria for evaluating Rule 11
motions, Cooper illustrates that some courts nevertheless con-
tinue to apply a subjective standard to pro se litigants.
B. Courts That Consider a Pro Se Litigant's Special
Circumstances in the Reasonableness Determination
The majority of cases demonstrate that courts consider pro
se litigants' special circumstances to determine the reasonable-
ness of the inquiry into the law and facts. This approach is
premised on the Advisory Committee's statement in its note to
amended Rule 11 that the courts have "sufficient discretion to
take account of the special circumstances that often arise in
pro se situations,"'  as well as the considerations identified by
the Supreme Court in Haines v. Kerner.5 Therefore, courts
that follow this approach consider such factors as a pro se liti-
gant's lack of legal training or legal advice when determining if
Rule 11 has been violated.
52
The United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan applied this standard in Loss v. Kipp."s The plain-
tiff in Loss brought an action in federal court for fraud arising
from a land contract with the defendant. This federal action
was filed after the defendant successfully brought a state court
foreclosure action against the plaintiff for failing to make
48. Id. at *6-7.
49. Id. at *7 (citing Auen v. Sweeney, 109 F.R.D. 678, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1986)).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
51. 404 U.S. 519 (1972). See infra note 85 and text accompanying notes 138-40.
52. See Booker v. Buckley, 810 F.2d 199, 199 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Plaintiff's pro se
status and absence of legal advice are appropriate factors as special circumstances to be
considered when determining if Rule 11 has been violated"); Harris v. Heinrich, 919
F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1990) (requiring consideration of pro se status when determining
whether the filing was reasonable); Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235 (11th Cir. 1989)
(requiring courts to take into account plaintiff's pro se status when determining
whether the filing was reasonable); Otis v. Colorado Springs Cablevision, No. 91-M-
1376, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17178 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 1992) (holding that pro se status
must be considered when determining if Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate).
53. No. 1:91-CV-157, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8195 (W.D. Mich. June 11, 1991).
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timely monthly payments.' In the federal action, the plaintiff
alleged Fourth Amendment violations.5 The defendant moved
for summary judgment and sought Rule 11 sanctions, alleging
that plaintiff was merely attempting to relitigate the state
court foreclosure action.5
The district court agreed with the defendant and found
that the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate a claim that had
been fully adjudicated in state court.57 The defendant's motion
for summary judgment was granted," but the court denied the
defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions.5 9 The court recog-
nized that the plaintiff's complaint and subsequent pleadings
were objectively frivolous and that he was "not a stranger to
the 'pro se bar' "w because he had filed seven cases in the pre-
vious two years.61 Nevertheless, the court refused to sanction
the plaintiff because it recognized that "a pro se litigant plain-
tiff is given more leeway under Rule 11 that [sic] an attorney
normally enjoys. However, even pro se litigants may be sanc-
tioned if they continue to file frivolous lawsuits raising the
same or similar claims.16 2
Thus, by considering special circumstances, such as a lack
of legal training, in the determination of reasonableness, courts
apply a lower standard to pro se litigants than is applied to
attorneys or represented parties.63
C. Courts That Apply a Single Objective Test
Under a single test, courts do in fact consider the special
54. Id. at *2.
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id. at *7.
58. Loss, No. 1:91-CV-157, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8195, at *9.
59. Id. at *8-9.
60. Id. at *8. "Pro se bar" is a term used by courts to refer to pro se litigants who




63. Other courts have considered pro se litigants' special circumstances in applying
the Rule 11 standard. For instance, in Patterson v. Aiken, 111 F.R.D. 354 (N.D. Ga.
1986), the court found that Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate for certain claims in the
plaintiff's complaint. As to the plaintiff's other claims, the court denied defendant's
motion for sanctions because the "plaintiff conducted the kind of inquiry any layman
with his education would have conducted." Id. at 358. See also Silvey v. I.R.S., No. 88-
4229-R, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8916 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 1989); Golyar v. McCausland, No.
4:89-CV-82, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3260 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 1991); Posner v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 713 F. Supp. 562 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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circumstances intertwined with the application of Rule 11 to
pro se litigants. Courts that apply a single test, however, do
not consider these special circumstances when determining
whether Rule 11 has been violated. Rather, a pro se litigant's
status is considered only when determining an appropriate
sanction once it is determined that Rule 11 has been violated.'
The Ninth Circuit recently applied a single objective test
and found Rule 11 sanctions against a pro se litigant in Manuel
v. East Palo Alto.' The plaintiff in.Vtanuel was the majority
stockholder in a corporation that owrled buildings on a parcel
of land in East Palo Alto.' The buildings were condemned to
be demolished by the City. The plaintiff filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia seeking a temporary restraining order, damages, and an
injunction against the City.67 The plaintiff's motion for the
temporary restraining order was denied and the buildings were
destroyed.68 Subsequently, the plaintiff recorded lis pendens 9
on the property of certain government officials named as
defendants in the complaint.
The plaintiff in Manuel then filed a second complaint for
inverse condemnation in the Eastern District of California on
the same piece of property.70 This case was transferred to the
Northern District and was consolidated with plaintiff's initial
complaint.71 The City brought a motion to dismiss both com-
plaints, a motion to dismiss the lis pendens, and a motion for
64. See cases cited supra note 16. See also Louisville v. Armored Transp. of
California, No. C-90-0266, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2523 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1991); Dyson
v. Sposeep, 637 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (stating that the language of Rule 11 does
not establish a lesser standard for pro se litigants than for attorneys); Wiideman v.
McKay, 132 F.R.D. 62, 65 (D. Nev. 1990) ("A pro se litigant is under the same
obligation as an attorney to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts of a matter prior
to filing an action"); Unanue v. Unanue, 132 F.R.D. 146 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding that
plaintiff's pro se status is irrelevant to determination of whether Rule 11 has been
violated); Day v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (holding
that Rule 11 establishes a single standard for all parties).
65. Nos. 89-15896, 89-15897, 89-15963, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11156 (9th Cir. May 24,
1991).
66. Id. at *3.
67. Id. at "1.
68. Id.
69. Lis pendens is "I]urisdiction, power, or control which courts acquire over
property in suit pending action and until final judgment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
840 (5th ed. 1979). Further, a notice of lis pendens is "a notice filed on public records
for the purpose or warning all persons that the title to certain property is in litigation,
and that they are in danger of being bound by an adverse judgment." Id.
70. Manuel, Nos. 89-15896, 89-15897, 89-15963, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11156, at *2.
71. Id.
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Rule 11 sanctions."2 The court dismissed the actions because
the plaintiff did not have standing,7" but denied defendant's
motion for Rule 11 sanctions.74
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that
Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate.7 5 The court recognized
that the standard under Rule 11 is objective and that "sanc-
tions are... appropriate against a pro se plaintiff when he vio-
lates Rule 11 by signing and submitting a pleading that is not
warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for modifi-
cation thereof."'76 The plaintiff failed to assert any reasonable
argument to support his standing to sue as an individual or on
behalf of his corporation.77 The court applied a single objective
test to determine that Rule 11 was violated, and then it stated
that plaintiff's pro se status is an appropriate consideration in
fashioning a sanction.78
Thus, under a single objective standard, the subjective
characteristics such as the extent of one's legal training, legal
knowledge, or legal advice, are only considered in determining
an appropriate sanction under Rule 11 after a violation has
been found using an objective standard.
Despite the differing standards applied by courts, sanctions
have been applied or upheld in numerous cases brought against
pro se litigants. 79 However, while a "proper" result may be
reached under a different standard, there is, nevertheless, a
need for uniform application. One of the primary goals of the
72. Id.
73. The court found that the corporate powers of Barca Corp., the corporation of
which the plaintiff was the majority stockholder, had been suspended under both
Delaware and California law prior to the commencement of both of the plaintiff's
complaints. Therefore, the court stated that "Itlhe law is clear that a shareholder does
not have standing to redress an injury to the corporation." Id. at *3.
74. Id.
75. Manuel, No. 89-15896, 89-15897, 89-15963, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11156, at *5.
76. Id. at *4-5.
77. Id. at *5.
78. Id at *6.
79. See Kadan v. Williams, No. 89 Civ. 3379 (SWK), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1990) (upholding sanctions considering pro se litigant's special
circumstances for claims against judge where the law is well-settled that judges have
absolute immunity); Carroll v. Philadelphia, Civil Actions Nos. 87-0592, 87-6258, 88-
1239, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11652 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1989) (recognizing that pro se
litigants are held to lower standard, but upholding sanctions because pro se litigant
abused process by filing several frivolous lawsuits); Johnson v. United States, 607 F.
Supp. 347 (D.C. Pa. 1985) (recognizing that pro se status must be taken into account
when determining reasonableness, but upholding sanctions because claim was not
warranted by the law).
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Advisory Committee, as previously discussed, was to establish
more concrete standards under which Rule 11 motions are to
be analyzed. This goal is not accomplished when Rule 11 is
interpreted and applied inconsistently. To promote consistent
application and to establish standards recognizable by pro se
litigants and the courts, a single objective test should be used.
III. RATIONALE FOR APPLYING A SINGLE OBJECTIVE TEST
Under Rule 11 there are three requirements placed on a
litigant. First, there must be a reasonable inquiry into the
facts underlying the pleading. Second, there must be a reason-
able inquiry into the law supporting the pleading. Third, the
pleading must not be filed for an improper purpose."0
The difficulty with holding a pro se litigant to a single
objective standard arises only as to one of these requirements.
Specifically, a pro se litigant is only held to a "higher stan-
dard" under a single objective test with respect to the reason-
able inquiry into the law requirement. The first requirement
of a reasonable inquiry into the underlying facts does not
require examination of the pro se litigant's legal knowledge.
Rather, the consideration is only whether the litigant obtained
all factual information reasonably available prior to filing.
Similarly, the improper purpose analysis under the third
requirement does not focus on the pro se litigant's legal knowl-
edge. This factor is an objective consideration of whether the
pleading was vexatious or filed for purposes of harassment or
delay. Because, however, all of these factors are clearly objec-
tive considerations, no difficulty should arise in applying them
equally to pro se litigants and attorneys. The following argu-
ments are therefore advanced in favor of a single objective test
applied to all parties and to all three requirements of Rule 11.
A. Rule 11 and Pro Se Litigants
The first argument derives from the explicit language of
Rule 11 and from a proper interpretation of the Advisory Com-
mittee Note. Rule 11 is applicable to pro se litigants because
the language specifically states that "[a] party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion,
or other paper and state the party's address.""' The rule then
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
81. Id.
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provides that "[t]he signature of an attorney or a party consti-
tutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper."' 2 This provision subjects
any party signing a pleading to the certification requirements
regarding reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal bases of
the claim. 3
Problems with the application of Rule 11 to pro se litigants
arise from the Advisory Committee Note. The Advisory Com-
mittee states that "[a]lthough the standard is the same for
unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the
pleadings, the court has sufficient discretion to take account of
the special circumstances that often arise in pro se situa-
tions."'  The Advisory Committee then cites Haines v. Ker-
ner85  as support for consideration of these special
circumstances. Many courts, therefore, have used this state-
ment by the Advisory Committee in conjunction with Haines
as support for factoring a pro se litigant's lack of legal training,
the "special circumstances," into the determination of
reasonableness.'
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
84. Id.
85. 404 U.S. 519 (1972). In Haines, an inmate in the Illinois State Penitentiary
filed an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the governor of Illinois and
various prison officials alleging that he had been subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment. The district court hearing the case granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court of appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court stated that "[w]hatever may be the
limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons,
allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are
sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence." Haines, 404 U.S. at
520.
Haines has subsequently been interpreted to support the proposition that pro se
litigants' complaints are to be liberally construed when faced with a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dyson v. Sposeep, 637 F. Supp.
616, 619-20 (N.D. Ind. 1986) ("When such a complaint [drafted by a pro se litigant] is
challenged by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint's allegations
must be judged by a standard less stringent than those of a complaint drafted by
counsel"); Hoover v. Gershman Investment Corp., No. 91-10851-S, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13533, at *9 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1991) ("a less stringent standard is generally
applied to pleadings drafted by pro se litigants when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is at
issue"); Kadan v. Williams, No. 89 Civ. 3379 (SWK), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1990) (citing Haines, the court stated that "the standard is even
stricter for dismissal of a pro se complaint").
86. See Harris v. Trans World Airlines, No. C89-2097 TEH, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7700, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 1990) (holding that "courts may 'take account of the
special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations' "); Pawlowske v. Chrysler
Corp., 623 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. 11. 1985) ("pro se litigants are subject to Rule 11,
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It is therefore the consideration of a pro se litigant's spe-
cial circumstances that raises the central problem in the appli-
cation of Rule 11 to pro se litigants. As previously noted, Rule
11 involves three requirements: (1) reasonable inquiry into the
facts, (2) reasonable inquiry into the law, and (3) no improper
purpose. Evaluation of the pro se litigant's special circum-
stances is not required when determining if there was a rea-
sonable inquiry into the facts or whether there was an
improper purpose. These factors are purely objective consider-
ations and do not require an inquiry into the pro se litigant's
legal knowledge or training. Accordingly, as to these two
prongs of Rule 11, an objective standard is appropriate. The
difficulty arises when evaluating the litigant's legal knowledge.
The litigant's legal knowledge is relevant when determin-
ing whether a reasonable inquiry into the law was made. The
problem, however, is whether a pro se litigant's status, as a liti-
gant who has not received any legal training, is a factor to be
considered when determining the reasonableness of the certifi-
cation requirement of Rule 11.8 Courts that consider a pro se
litigant's lack of formal legal training at this stage generally
hold pro se litigants to a lower standard of conduct than is
required of attorneys under Rule 11.' However, the language
of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee Note support an inter-
pretation which provides that pro se litigants are subject to the
same standard as any party, attorney or otherwise, who signs a
pleading, motion or other paper.
Thus, Rule 11 can be interpreted as requiring a single
objective standard for three reasons. First, a strict reading of
Rule 11 does not reveal any distinctions drawn between attor-
neys, represented parties, and pro se litigants. Rather, Rule 11
states that "[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by the signer," and subjects the signer to the certifi-
cation requirements of Rule 11.9 Further, with respect to
sanctions, Rule 11 provides that the court "shall impose on the
though the concerns of Haines v. Kerner,[citation omitted], must be taken into account
in evaluating pro se papers"); Carroll v. Philadelphia, Nos. 87-0592, 87-6258, 88-1239,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11652, at *8 (E.D.P. Sept. 28, 1989) ("pro se litigants are held 'to
less stringent standards' than lawyers"); Vizvary v. Vignati, 134 F.R.D. 28 (D.R.I. June
15, 1990) (citing the Advisory Committee Note and stating that appropriate standard is
the reasonable pro se litigant). See also cases cited supra note 52.
87. See supra note 52 for cases holding that pro se status should be a factor that is
considered when determining reasonableness.
88. See supra note 8.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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person who signed it [the pleading, motion, or other paper], a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, .... 90
The rule explicitly recognizes the different categories of per-
sons to whom the rule applies-attorneys, represented parties,
and pro se litigants-but it does not state that one is to be held
to a different standard than the other.
Second, the amended rule was intended to act as a deter-
rent to the abuse of pleadings and other papers.9' To accom-
plish this purpose, the Advisory Committee recognized that
"this standard is more stringent than the original good-faith
formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of circum-
stances will trigger its violation."92 Holding pro se litigants to
a lower standard than attorneys and represented parties would
restrict the application of Rule 11 because a more flagrant vio-
lation by a pro se litigant would be required to incur sanctions.
Therefore, a more liberal interpretation of Rule 11 may not
deter the filing of abusive and frivolous pleadings by pro se
litigants.
Finally, the Advisory Committee Note indicates that the
special circumstances of a pro se litigant should only be consid-
ered once a violation of Rule 11 has been found using a single
objective test. As previously noted, the Advisory Committee
Note recognizes that the same standard applies to attorneys
and to pro se litigants and that "the court has sufficient discre-
tion to take account of the special circumstances that often
arise in pro se situations."93  However, the Advisory Commit-
tee further states that
in considering the nature and severity of the sanctions to be
imposed, the court should take account of the state of the
attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowledge when
the pleading or other paper was signed. Thus, for example,
when a party is not represented by counsel, the absence of
legal advice is an appropriate factor to consider.
94
The language of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee
Note therefore support the conclusion that a single objective
standard should be applied to pro se litigants, attorneys, and
represented parties, and that a pro se litigant's special circum-
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id, (emphasis added).
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stances should be considered only when determining an appro-
priate sanction for violation of Rule 11, but not when
determining if the rule has been violated.
B. Implications of Business Guides v. Chromatic
Communications Enterprises on the Application of
Rule 11 to Pro Se Litigants
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court fur-
ther support a conclusion that Rule 11 requires the application
of a single objective test. The Supreme Court has not decided
a case specifically dealing with the application of Rule 11 to
pro se litigants. The Court has, however, decided several cases
that affect the application of Rule 11 to pro se litigants. For
instance, in Pavelic LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,
9 5
the Court ruled that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
given their "plain meaning," and "when we find the terms...
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete."" Thus, in deter-
mining how to apply Rule 11 to pro se litigants, the Court's
language indicates that Rule 11 must be strictly interpreted.
Next, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp.,'" the Court rec-
ognized that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to curb abuse of
the judicial system. Further, Rule 11 is meant to "deter base-
less filings in District Court, and, thus, consistent with the
Rules Enabling Act's grant of authority, streamline the admin-
istration and procedure of the federal courts."9 Therefore,
"any interpretation [of Rule 11] must give effect to the rule's
central goal of deterrence. '
Finally, in Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises,'°° the Court addressed the Rule 11 certification
95. 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
96. Id. at 458. In Pavelic, the Court dealt with the issue of whether an attorney
may be sanctioned individually under Rule 11 or whether a district court can sanction
the attorney's firm on whose behalf the attorney signed the pleading. The Court held
that under the strict language of Rule 11, only the individual attorney, and not the law
firm represented, may be sanctioned. Id. at 458-59.
97. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990). Cooter & Gell addressed the issue of the certification
requirements of attorneys under Rule 11. The Court again strictly interpreted the
language of Rule 11 to affirm the imposition of sanctions against an attorney because
of "grossly inadequate" pre-filing inquiries. Id. at 2452.
98. Id. at 2454.
99. Id.
100. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991). See also Scott B. Gilly, Note, Business Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Communications Enterprises: The Case for Rule 11 Reform, 41 CATH. U. L.
REV. 979 (1992) (examining the development of Rule 11 sanctions on attorneys and
represented parties in light of Business Guides).
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requirements. The basic issue in Business Guides was whether
a represented party'0 ' is subject to Rule 11 sanctions. The
plaintiff, Business Guides, published business directories for
specialized areas of retail trade.0 2 In order to prevent copying
by other publishers, Business Guides planted "seeds" in their
directories. 0 3 A seed is a minor alteration in an otherwise
accurate listing. Business Guides considered the presence of
seeds in competitors' directories to indicate copyright
infringement. 1°4
In October 1986, Business Guides, through its counsel, filed
an action in United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California seeking a temporary restraining order
(TRO) against Chromatic for copyright infringement and
unfair competition."15 Business Guides alleged that it had
found ten seeds in a directory published by Chromatic."°6 The
TRO application was signed by Business Guides' counsel and
by the president of Business Guides.107 Additionally, Business
Guides submitted sealed affidavits in support of the TRO
application."0'
Prior to the hearing on the TRO in November 1986, the
judge's law clerk spent one hour calling the alleged seeded list-
ings.1" 9 The law clerk discovered that nine of the ten allegedly
seeded listings in fact contained correct information.11 Thus,
only one of the listings alleged by Business Guides to be copied
in fact contained false information.
Based on this finding, the district court judge denied the
TRO application and referred the case to a magistrate to deter-
mine whether Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed."' The
magistrate conducted evidentiary hearings where Business
Guides explained that the claim for ten allegedly copied list-
ings was the result of inaccurate research." 2 Nevertheless, the
101. A represented party under Rule 11 is one that is represented by counsel
during the course of litigation, as opposed to an unrepresented party (a pro se litigant)
or an attorney.









111. Id. at 926.
112. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 926.
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magistrate concluded that Business Guides "failed to conduct a
proper inquiry, resulting in the presentation of unreasonable
and false information to the court."11 Therefore, the magis-
trate recommended that Rule 11 sanctions be imposed on both
Business Guides and its counsel." 4
The district court agreed with this recommendation and
stated that "[t]he standard of conduct under Rule 11 is one of
objective reasonableness. Applying this standard to the cir-
cumstances of this case, it is clear that both Business Guides
and Finley Kumble [counsel) have violated the Rule.""' 5 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed," 6 and Busi-
ness Guides appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court also affirmed the imposition of sanc-
tions against Business Guides." 7 Business Guides argued that
Rule 11 only applies to attorneys and pro se litigants, not to
represented parties."s The Court disagreed. The Court recog-
nized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are given their
plain meaning and that Rule 11 is "aimed at curbing abuses of
the judicial system."" 9 The Court therefore determined that
limiting the application of Rule 11 to attorneys and unrepre-
sented parties would be an unnatural reading of the rule. 2
Further, the Court stated that "[h]ad the Advisory Committee
intended to limit the application of the certification standard to
parties proceeding pro se, they would surely have said so. Else-
where in the text, the Committee demonstrated its ability to
distinguish between represented and unrepresented parties."''




116. The 9th Circuit stated:
IThe rule draws no distinction between the state of mind of attorneys and
parties. There is nothing in the rule to suggest that a represented party may
only be sanctioned for bad faith. On the contrary, the rule, by requiring any
"signer" of a paper (attorney or party) to conduct a "reasonable inquiry,"
would appear to prescribe similar standards for attorneys and parties.
Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 892 F.2d 802, 809 (9th Cir.
1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991) (emphasis in original omitted).
117. Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 922,
935 (1991).
118. Id. at 929-30.
119. Id. at 928.
120. Id. at 929.
121. Id. at 930.
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applicable to attorneys, pro se litigants, and represented
parties.
The Court then addressed the certification requirement of
Rule 11. The Court looked at the purpose of Rule 11 and the
fact that "[t]he essence of Rule 11 is that signing [a pleading or
other paper] is no longer a meaningless act; it denotes merit. A
signature sends a message to the district court that this docu-
ment is to be taken seriously."' 22 Moreover, the Court, like the
Ninth Circuit, indicated that the language of the rule "draws
no distinction between the state of mind of attorneys and par-
ties" and "states unambiguously that any signer must conduct
a reasonable inquiry or face sanctions."' 23 The Court explicitly
rejected holding a represented party to a lesser standard than
attorneys and pro se litigants. Rather, the Court stated:
Giving the text [of Rule 11] its plain meaning, we hold that it
imposes on any party who signs a pleading, motion or other
paper.. . an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the facts and the law before filing, and the applicable
standard is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances.
124
The Supreme Court's decision in Business Guides supports
an interpretation that Rule 11 imposes a single objective stan-
dard in all contexts for several reasons. First, the Court
emphasized in Business Guides that Rule 11 is strictly inter-
preted and is given its plain meaning. As the Court pointed
out, the language of Rule 11 does not distinguish between
attorneys, represented parties, and pro se litigants. If the
Advisory Committee intended Rule 11 to apply different stan-
dards to different persons, it did not specify so in the language
of the rule. Under a strict reading, Rule 11 applies equally to
"all parties signing a pleading, motion, or other paper."' 5
Second, the Business Guides Court determined that there
is a single objective test of "reasonableness under the circum-
stances" applicable to all parties. In fact, the Court explicitly
rejected the argument posed by Business Guides that a less
stringent subjective test should be applied to represented par-
ties.12' As the Court noted, the language of Rule 11 is clear
122. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 930.
123. Id. at 932.
124. Id. at 933 (emphasis added).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
126. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933.
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and does not distinguish between parties signing pleadings.127
Consideration of pro se litigants' status and special circum-
stances creates a subjective test. Instead of focusing on the
reasonableness of the pro se litigant's inquiry, a court would be
forced to consider the extent of the pro se litigant's legal
knowledge, expertise, and abilities. Consideration of these fac-
tors would require the judge to use more discretion in deter-
mining whether Rule 11 was violated and would reduce the
judge's reliance on more objective criteria. Further, because
subjective bad faith is difficult to prove, Rule 11 would be uti-
lized less frequently in pro se litigation. This application is
contrary to the goal of the Advisory Committee to increase the
use and effectiveness of Rule 11 as a deterrent to abusive and
frivolous litigation.
The Court specifically rejected a subjective test under
Rule 11 in Business Guides. The Court held that the applica-
tion of subjective standards to some parties does not promote
the purposes and rationales behind the 1983 amendment to
Rule 11.128 The primary goal of Rule 11 is to prevent abuse of
the judicial system through the filing of frivolous and abusive
pleadings.1 29 With this goal in mind, the Advisory Committee
amended Rule 11 to impose a certification requirement on any
person signing a pleading or other paper. Given the Court's
application of Rule 11 to represented parties in Business
Guides, the Court's refusal to apply a lesser standard to repre-
sented parties, and the Court's recognition of a single objective
standard, it is reasonable to conclude that under a single objec-
tive standard, consideration of a pro se litigant's special circum-
stances would not factor into the determination of whether
Rule 11 has been violated.
Thus, the Supreme Court interprets the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure literally so as to give the rules their "plain
meaning," and, in Business Guides, the Court interpreted Rule
11 as imposing a single objective standard. The Court's applica-
tion of Rule 11 to represented parties in Business Guides sug-
gests that Rule 11 should be applied consistently to all parties
and that distinctions are not to be drawn between attorneys,
represented parties, and pro se litigants.
127. Id. at 932.
128. Id. at 928-31.
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
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C. Further Arguments in Favor of a Single Objective Test
Under Rule 11
A pro se litigant is held to a higher standard only when
determining if a reasonable inquiry was made into the law.
Under a single objective test, the special circumstances of a pro
se litigant, namely the lack of formal legal training, are consid-
ered only to determine an appropriate sanction after a viola-
tion of Rule 11 has been found. As previously discussed, the
language of Rule 11, the Advisory Committee Note, and the
Supreme Court's decision in Business Guides support the con-
clusion that Rule 11 imposes a single objective test. There are
several additional arguments in favor of a single objective test
which demonstrate that a single standard can be applied with-
out imposing undue hardship or fundamental unfairness on
pro se litigants.
1. Analogies to Other Areas of Law
Several areas of the law recognize that an individual may
be held to a higher level of conduct than is ordinarily expected.
For instance, in the substantive law of torts, many courts rec-
ognize that children may be held to a higher standard in negli-
gence actions. Ordinarily, a child is held to the same standard
as other children of "like age, intelligence and experience. "130
However, a majority of jurisdictions now recognize that when
children undertake certain activities that are normally for
adults only, such as driving a car or flying an airplane, a child
will not be held to the normal standard.13' Rather, the child
will be held to the heightened standard of an adult because of
the nature of the activity and the potential danger to others. 32
130. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32
(5th ed. 1984). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1984) defines the standard of
conduct as follows: "If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must
conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence,
and experience under like circumstances."
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1984) recognizes that a child is not
held to the usual standard of conduct when that child undertakes activities requiring
adult qualifications. For application of this exception, see Prichard v. Veterans Cab
Co., 480 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1965); Robinson v. Lindsay, 92 Wash. 2d 410, 598 P.2d 392 (1979);
Fishel v. Givens, 362 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. 1977).
132. KEETON ET AL., supra note 130, at 181. The rationale for this exception is that
because the activity undertaken requires adult qualifications, no allowance will be
made for the child's immaturity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1984).
The Restatement analogizes this exception for children to the standard of conduct
required of an individual undertaking professional activity. According to the
Restatement, "one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or
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A similar standard is found in the law of corporations as to
a corporate director's fiduciary duty of care. Once a person
accepts a position as a director of a corporation he or she is
generally held to the standard of an "ordinarily prudent direc-
tor."'33 This duty requires a director to undertake certain
activities such as attending board meetings, keeping informed
with corporate matters, and becoming familiar with the corpo-
rations financial statements.'" These duties are required
regardless of one's business knowledge or background, and the
duty imposes on a director the duty to obtain the requisite
knowledge and information necessary to fulfill the duty of
care.1
35
These examples demonstrate how certain areas of the law
recognize that a person may be held to a higher standard
under specific circumstances. With regard to pro se litigants,
the fact that a pro se litigant possesses no formal legal training
should not be a factor in determining whether Rule 11 was vio-
lated. As with a corporate director, a pro se litigant has the
responsibility to research the basis for a lawsuit as part of the
privilege and right to have a lawsuit heard in federal court.
With respect to Rule 11, this higher standard is reflected in the
duty to reasonably investigate the law underlying a pleading or
motion. Under a single objective test, a pro se litigant is
trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members
of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities." Id. § 299A.
Similarly, pro se litigants should be held to a higher level of conduct under Rule 11
because of the responsibilities inherent in representing oneself in a court of law.
133. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 234 (3d ed. 1983). See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99
F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938); Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501 (Va. 1933). Henn and
Alexander note that the standard is also sometimes referred to as that of a "reasonably
prudent person" or an "ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances." HENN
& ALEXANDER, supra § 234, at 622.
In Washington, under the Washington Business Corporation Act, a director of a
corporation must act "[w]ith the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances .... " WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.300
(West Supp. 1993).
134. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 133, § 234, at 621-623.
135. For instance, in Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. Super.
1981), the wife of the chief executive officer of a corporation was named a director of
that corporation. The wife was found to have subsequently breached her duty of care
in exercising her duties as a corporate director. The trial court stated the following
regarding the fact that the wife had no formal business training or knowledge: "The
problem is not that Mrs. Pritchard was a simple housewife. The problem is that she
was a person who took a job which necessarily entailed certain responsibilities and she
then failed to make any effort whatever to discharge those responsibilities." Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 392 A.2d 1233, 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
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required to make such an inquiry to determine whether there
is a sound legal basis, regardless of the litigant's lack of legal
knowledge.
Further, just as in the law of torts and corporations, there
are several policy considerations that favor holding pro se liti-
gants to a higher standard. First, much time and many
resources are wasted when courts must hear frivolous cases.
The courts' time and resources are spent on claims without
merit to the detriment to those litigants with valid complaints.
Second, defendants are also forced to expend time and
resources to defend against these lawsuits. Presumably, their
time and money could be expended toward more productive
pursuits in the absence of frivolous litigation. Therefore, in
light of these concerns, pro se status should not be an excuse
for failing to follow procedural and substantive requirements
or for filing frivolous claims.
2. A Single Test Can Preserve Pro Se Litigants' Access to
Courts and Uphold the Goals of the Advisory
Committee
A single standard can be applied to pro se litigants without
restricting their constitutionally guaranteed right of access to
the courts.13 A concern frequently expressed against applica-
tion of a single standard is that pro se litigants will be unable
to meet this "heightened standard" and will either be pre-
vented access or be deterred from filing claims.137 However, in
136. An individual's constitutional right of access to the courts is derived from the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that litigation is a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment); McCoy v. Goldin, 598 F. Supp. 310 (D.C.N.Y. 1984) (stating that the right
of access to the courts derives from the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Sutton v. County Court of Racine County, Wisconsin,
353 F. Supp. 716 (D. Wis. 1973).
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend I. The
court in Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1986), recognized that "the
right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the constitution
and laws." Id. at 911.
Additionally, an individual has a statutory right to self-representation in federal
court. This statutory right is guaranteed as follows: "In all courts of the United States
the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the
rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein." 28 U.S.C. ANN. § 1654 (West 1966).
137. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 380 (asserting that application of Rule 11
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light of the Supreme Court's decision in Haines v. Kerner,"3
pro se litigants' access to the courts will not be hindered by a
single standard.
In Haines, the Court held that pro se litigants' pleadings
are to be liberally construed and are to be held to a less strin-
gent standard at the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
stage than are pleadings drafted by lawyers.'3 9 Therefore, pro
se litigants are given the benefit of the doubt at the initial
stage of proceedings and have effectively "gotten in the door."
At the 12(b)(6) stage, Rule 11, under either a single test or a
test that considers pro se litigants' special circumstances, will
not prevent pro se litigants from having their complaints heard
because of the leniency given to pro se litigants.
Thus, applying a single objective standard to pro se liti-
gants will not deny access to the courts because the Supreme
Court's decision in Haines effectively lets pro se litigants in by
liberally construing their pleadings. The Court recognized that
at the 12(b)(6) stage, a court must consider the fact that a pro
se litigant does not have the formal legal training and knowl-
edge of an attorney.1 40 Rule 11 is therefore merely a tool to
monitor pro se litigants' conduct once they are past the initial
proceedings.
3. Rule 11 as a Monitoring Device of Pro Se Conduct
Rule 11 is needed as a monitoring device of pro se litigants'
conduct. Attorneys are subject to many certification require-
ments and doctrines that monitor their conduct in federal dis-
trict courts. For instance, in order to practice law an attorney
generally must have a law degree from a certified law school
and must have passed a state bar examination to certify legal
competence.' 4 ' Moreover, an attorney is subject to Rule 11
sanctions to pro se litigants may discourage that individual from filing future lawsuits,
thereby discouraging an individual from exercising his or her right to access the
courts).
138. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
139. 1& at 520.
140. Id.
141. Washington State, for instance, requires the following-
[A] person shall not appear as an attorney or counsel in any of the courts of
the State of Washington, or practice law in this state, unless that person has
passed the Washington State bar examination, has complied with the other
requirements of these rules, and is an active member of the Washington State
Bar Association.
WASHINGTON ADMISSION To PRACTICE RuLEs (APR) l(b) (1993). Additionally, in
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sanctions, malpractice claims from clients, and more impor-
tantly, Codes of Professional Responsibility."4
On the other hand, pro se litigants have no certification
requirement, nor are they subject to codes of professional con-
duct against which their actions are judged. Pro se status
should not be an excuse for failing to follow procedural
requirements or for failing to meet the certification require-
ments of Rule 11 when filing pleadings or motions. 43 Rule 11,
therefore, is one of the few means available to monitor and
regulate pro se litigants' conduct regarding pleadings and
motions."
Thus, recognizing the concerns expressed in Haines, the
application of a single objective standard can be interpreted as
applying a stricter standard on pro se litigants once past the
12(b)(6) stage.145 Courts should liberally construe a pro se liti-
order to qualify to sit for the Washington State bar examination, an individual must
first provide proof of the following:
(i) graduation from a law school approved by the Board of Governors, or (ii)
completion of the law clerk program proscribed by these rules, or (iii) admis-
sion to the practice of law by examination, together with current good stand-
ing, in any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia,
and active legal experience for at least 3 of the 5 years immediately preceding
the filing of the application.
APR 3(b) (1993).
Furthermore, once an individual has passed the bar examination and has been
admitted to the bar association, each individual must complete 45 credit hours of con-
tinuing legal education every three years. APR 11.2 (1993).
142. See, e.g., WASHINGTON STATE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1993).
These rules establish the "minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action." Preliminary Statement to the
WASHINGTON STATE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. Pursuant to Rule 3.1, "[a]
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." WASHINGTON
STATE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1993) (emphasis added). Note that
this language from Rule 3.1 mirrors the language of FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
143. Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905, 910 (S.D.Tex. 1986). In Elmore the
court stated that "Itlhe right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity
of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law." Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.
46 (1975)).
144. Cf. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional
Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793 (1991) (arguing that Rule 11 should be utilized as
a tool to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct in litigation rather than as a means
to compensate litigants who are victims of unprofessional conduct).
145. Note that this application does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of
imposing sanctions on a pro se litigant at the 12(b)(6) stage. Sanctions may be
appropriate if there is clearly an improper purpose. It is also important to note that a
violation of Rule 11 may be found if any of these factors are not met. However, in
terms of inquiry into the law, Rule 11 is especially applicable after the 12(b)(6) stage
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gant's complaint at the early stages of the proceedings because
of the inherent discrepancies that may exist between pro se lit-
igants and attorneys. However, once past the 12(b)(6) stage,
pro se litigants must be held to a higher level of conduct under
a single objective standard.
4. A Single Objective Test is Needed to Prevent Abusive and
Frivolous Pleadings
Proponents of holding pro se litigants to a lesser standard
in light of "special circumstances" believe that a lower stan-
dard is required because pro se litigants have no formal legal
training and because pro se litigants are incapable of under-
standing precedent.'" However, in light of those cases where
Rule 11 sanctions have been sought against pro se litigants,
such an assumption is not entirely valid. While pro se litigants
may not have formal legal training, many have acquired legal
knowledge and ability through filing multiple complaints.
Many courts recognize the existence of a "pro se bar"'147 and
that pro se litigants are not ignorant of the law based on prior
filings.14
Pro se litigants' practical knowledge is often evident in liti-
gation involving inmate civil rights actions. 49 Many inmates
because, under Haines, pro se litigants' complaints are interpreted in favor of a valid
claim.
146. Nichols, supra 6, at 370-74. Nichols argues that Rule 11 sanctions do not deter
frivolous filings by pro se litigants because pro se litigants are incapable and "generally
incompetent to evaluate precedent." Id. at 371.
147. See supra note 60 defining "pro se bar."
148. In Woolum v. Seabold, 902 F.2d 1570 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth Circuit found
that the pro se plaintiffs were experienced litigants because the claim before the court
had been previously dismissed twice as frivolous. Similarly, in Carroll v. Philadelphia,
Nos. 87-0592, 87-6258, 88-1239, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11652 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1989), the
court upheld sanctions and stated that the pro se plaintiff was "no neophyte to the
justice system" because the same judge had previously dismissed an almost identical
civil rights lawsuit filed by plaintiff a year earlier. Id. at *11. See also Loss v. Kipp,
No. 1:91-CV-157, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8195, at *8 (W.D. Mich. June 11, 1991) (finding
that plaintiff was "not a stranger to the pro se bar" based on 7 previous filings); Kadan
v. Williams, No. 89 Civ. 3379 (SWK), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5541, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
11, 1990) (finding that plaintiff was "no stranger to the legal system" based on 12
pending pro se actions in various state courts).
149. In Woolum v. Seabold, 902 F.2d 1570 (6th Cir. 1990), the court upheld Rule 11
sanctions against an inmate proceeding pro se. The court upheld sanctions because the
plaintiff had brought an identical cause of action on two previous occasions. A jury
verdict for defendant was returned in the first action, and summary judgment for the
defendant was granted in the second action. The court also found that the plaintiff
was an "experienced litigant" based on his previous lawsuits. See also Procup v.
Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (pro se inmate filed 176 civil rights actions);
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gain a significant level of competence through researching and
filing many claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and from fellow
inmates who have become well-versed in the prison context of
civil rights litigation. Concededly, this level of knowledge can-
not be assumed to be held by all pro se litigants. However, the
number of cases involving pro se litigants who have filed mul-
tiple complaints refutes the assumption that pro se litigants
are ignorant and incapable of understanding legal concepts.1"
In addition, a principal reason for applying a single objec-
tive test is to prevent abusive use of pleadings and other
motions.15x As previously noted, the prevention of abusive
pleadings and the deterrence of frivolous lawsuits were two of
the primary goals of the Advisory Committee. 52 Abuse of
pleadings is readily apparent in pro se litigation through the
number of lawsuits filed that are dismissed as being frivo-
lous.' -S An extreme example is an inmate in Florida who,
prior to June 1983, filed one hundred seventy-six civil rights
lawsuits."M None of the cases reached trial on the merits and
most were dismissed as being frivolous.15
5
While the volume of complaints in the Florida case is
exceptional, there are many instances where pro se plaintiffs
have filed the same frivolous action repeatedly or have filed
multiple actions that are eventually dismissed as without
merit.'5 These multiple filings of frivolous and vexatious
claims are the sort of conduct that the Advisory Committee
Vester v. Murray, 683 F. Supp. 140, 142 (E.D. Vir. 1988) (recognizing pro se inmate as
renown writ writer).
150. See cases cited infra note 156.
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note (amended 1983).
152. Id. See supra part I.
153. See supra notes 8-11.
154. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986).
155. Id. at 1070.
156. See Tarlowski v. County of Lake, 775 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the
pro se plaintiff had brought eight frivolous lawsuits); Crooker v. United States
Marshals Serv., 641 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding that the pro se plaintiff filed
approximately 60 suits under the Freedom of Infromation Act over an eight-year
period); Sparrow v. Reynolds, 646 F. Supp. 834 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding that the pro se
plaintiff filed eighteen complaints for discrimination, all of which were dismissed as
frivolous); Harrell v. U.S., No. 91-3040, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6773, *1 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 9,
1991) (stating that the pro se plaintiff "darkens our doorstep once again" and filed the
same claim that was dismissed previously by the same court); Ford v. U.S., No. SH-C-
90-50, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10952 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 1990) (finding that the pro se
plaintiff had repeatedly used courts to relitigate the same issue as to whether wages
and pensions are income); Brock v. Hunsicker, Civ. No. 88-6468, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12546 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 1988) (finding that pro se plaintiff had filed eight complaints
for racial and gender discrimination).
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sought to eliminate through the stricter objective criteria of
amended Rule 11.1" Pro se status should not be seen as a
shield or an excuse for this type of behavior. As one court has
stated: "The right to self-representation is not a license to
abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not
to comply with the relevant rules or procedural and substan-
tive law."'" Application of a single objective test is necessary
to deter pro se litigants from filing frivolous lawsuits and abus-
ing the judicial process. A standard that takes the special cir-
cumstances of pro se representation into consideration will
simply allow abuses of the court system to continue.
Many pro se complaints are dismissed as frivolous because
the law relating to a plaintiff's claim is "well-settled."' 9
Courts that consider a pro se litigant's special circumstances
may deny a motion for sanctions in cases where the pro se
plaintiff failed to recognize that the law was well-settled and
did not support the claim." ° However, a pro se litigant's lack
of legal training should not be an excuse for failing to perform
a reasonable inquiry into the law. The standard under Rule 11
is not that of a reasonable attorney. Neither the language of
157. See discussion supra part I.
158. Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905, 910 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (citing Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975)). In Elmore, the court dismissed a pro se
plaintiff's complaint for alleged improprieties in a foreclosure sale as being "utterly
frivolous and without merit." I&, at 910. In dictum, the court then stated that there is
a major problem with the filing of frivolous actions by pro se litigants. The court
noted that there must be stricter application of Rule 11 sanctions in order to "protect
them [pro se litigants] from themselves." Id. at 911.
159. See Fanning v. Bear Stearns & Comp., No. 91-C-1461, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11891 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1991) (finding that pro se status is not a shield to excuse
frivolous use of federal courts and dismissing complaint as barred by well-settled law);
Sloan v. U.S., 621 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (D.C. Ind. 1985) (holding that the Internal
Revenue Service statute in question was clear to anyone who read the -statute and that
"such irresponsible use of the courts to harass the government and delay the orderly
administration of the IRS laws will not be tolerated"); Hoover v. Gershrnan Inv. Corp.,
No. 91-10851-S, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13533 (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 1991) (upholding
sanctions against pro se plaintiff whose complaint was clearly barred by lack of subject
matter and personal jurisdiction).
160. See Harrel v. U.S., 754 F. Supp. 1567 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that the pro se
plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata, but refusing to sanction because of pro se
status); Silvey v. I.R.S., No. 88-4229-R, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8916 (D. Kan. Feb. 3,
1989) (finding that the pro se plaintiff's claim was barred by sovereign immunity, but
not imposing sanctions even though claim appeared frivolous and vexatious); Connor v.
Merit Sys. Protection Bd., No. 87-3054, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3105 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
1988); Vizvary v. Vignati, 134 F.R.D. 28 (D.R.I. 1990) (finding that the pro se plaintiff
attempted to frame a probate matter under the guise of constitutional violations, but
refusing to sanction because a pro se litigant could not be expected to know that
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over probate matters).
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Rule 11 nor the Advisory Committee Note supports such an
interpretation. Rather, the standard is reasonableness under
the circumstances.
Therefore, under a single objective test, a pro se litigant
must make a reasonable inquiry into the law underlying the
pleading or motion. Expecting a pro se litigant to make an
investigation to determine that the law is well-settled may
require that individual to undertake responsibilities for which
he or she has not received formal training. Nevertheless, as
one court has stated, along with the right of access to the
courts comes certain responsibilities.'' Placing this require-
ment on pro se litigants is necessary to protect the interests of
adverse parties and the courts that hear pro se cases.
It is often asserted that leniency should be given to pro se
litigants in applying Rule 11 because of the inherent discrepan-
cies between attorneys and pro se litigants.6 2 However, in
looking out for the interests of the pro se litigants, the con-
cerns of the parties who defend against pro se litigants are
often overlooked. In particular, when pro se litigants are given
special consideration, the adverse parties must suffer the time
and cost of defending against often frivolous claims.'63 In
addressing this concern, one court stated the following:
The defendants in these suits, many of whom are of modest
means or indigent themselves, have a right not to be
harassed and burdened by frivolous litigation, and the Court
has a duty to protect them. The Court also has a duty to see
that justice is not delayed to other litigants with legitimate
complaints.'"
Additionally, courts are burdened with hearing these cases and
judicial resources may be expended to the detriment of other
litigants seeking redress in the courts.
65
Applying a single objective test under Rule 11 would allow
161. Vester v. Murray, 683 F. Supp. 140, 143 (E.D. Va. 1988). See also Elmore v.
McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905, 911-12 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
162. See Nichols, supra note 6. Nichols asserts that pro se litigants should be
treated differently than attorneys under Rule 11 because pro se litigants are incapable
of comprehending precedent, and are, therefore, incapable of determining whether a
claim has merit. Id. at 371.
163. See Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
164. Id. at 911
165. In upholding sanctions against a pro se inmate, the court in Dominguez v.
Figel, 626 F. Supp. 368 (M.D. Ga. 1986), noted that "a single hour spent by a federal
judge on a case costs the government Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00)." Id, at 374. The
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courts to address these concerns by imposing on pro se litigants
the duty to investigate the law and facts of their claims. A sin-
gle standard can both promote the goals of the Advisory Com-
mittee and protect pro se litigants' right to access the courts.
IV. APPLYING RULE 11 TO PRO SE LITIGANTS
In applying a single objective test, all parties who sign
pleadings, motions or other papers must be treated alike.
Under this approach, there should be no consideration of the
signer's knowledge when determining if there was a reason-
able inquiry or improper purpose under the circumstances.
Rather, the court should evaluate the following factors to
determine if sanctions are appropriate.
First, courts should consider the amount of time that was
available to investigate the law and/or facts underlying the
claim.' Second, courts should consider the extent to which a
pre-filing investigation of facts was feasible. 16' This factor
includes consideration of the extent to which facts were avail-
able at the time of filing. For instance, in some cases critical
facts and information are in the possession of the opposing
party or a third party and will only be obtained by the plaintiff
through the discovery process.'l 8 Third, courts should consider
the complexity of the legal issues in question.16 9 Fourth, courts
should consider the clarity or ambiguity of the law.170 Fifth,
courts should consider whether the pleading, motion, or other
paper was filed for an improper purpose.' 7 ' Such an improper
purpose may be shown by successive filings or pleadings that
are filed to harass, even though they may be well-grounded in
court calculated that plaintiff's "factually baseless" lawsuit, therefore, cost $3,450.00.
Id.
Further, the Seventh Circuit has expressed frustration resulting from the burdens
imposed on the courts by taxpayer lawsuits. The court has stated:
[W]e can no longer tolerate abuse of the judicial review process by
irresponsible taxpayers who press stale and frivolous arguments, without hope
of success on the merits, in order to delay or harass the collection of public
revenues or for other nonworthy purposes.... Abusers of the tax system have
no license to make irresponsible demands on the courts of appeals to consider
fanciful arguments put forward in bad faith.
Granzow v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 739 F.2d 265, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1984).
166. See ABA STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES, 121 F.R.D. 101, 114, 116 (1988).
167. Id. at 114.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 116.
170. Id.
171. Id at 121.
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law and fact. Finally, courts should consider whether the liti-
gant was the plaintiff or defendant.17  This is an important
factor in that most abusive litigation deals with filings by plain-
tiff to harass defendants. Thus, if sanctions are sought against
a defendant, the fact that the defendant did not initiate the
lawsuit and force another party into court is an important
consideration.
This is not an inclusive list of factors to be considered, but
it represents the critical considerations that should be evalu-
ated when applying Rule 11 to pro se litigants.173 It is also
important to note that all of the factors do not have to be ful-
filled in order to find a Rule 11 violation. For instance, a
pleading may be well-grounded in law or fact, but sanctions
may nevertheless be premised on a finding that the pleading
was filed for an improper purpose to harass the adverse
party.'74 This is equally true in the realm of pro se pleadings;
however, the cases suggest that where an improper purpose is
found, generally the underlying complaint was either factually
or legally frivolous. 75
Additionally, these factors do not eliminate the distinction
inherent in the determination of "reasonableness under the
circumstances" as to attorneys and pro se litigants. 76 This dis-
tinction is grounded in the nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. An attorney is largely dependent on the client for
providing critical factual information that is necessary to the
pleading or motion. Further, the amount of time that an attor-
ney has to research and prepare a pleading may sometimes
172. For instance, in Lagermax Lagerhaus v. Boroff, 115 F.R.D. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), the court refused to sanction a pro se defendant for improperly signing a
pleading where the defendant failed to properly admit citizenship in her answer to
plaintiff's complaint.
173. The Advisory Committee recognizes in its comments to the Proposed
Amendments that Rule 11 "does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should
consider in deciding whether to order a sanction or what sanctions would be
appropriate in the circumstances; . PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 137 F.R.D. 53, 79
(1991).
174. See Tarkowski v. County of Lake, 775 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1985); Sparrow v.
Reynolds, 646 F. Supp. 834 (D.D.C. 1986); Sloan v. U.S., 621 F. Supp. 1072 (D.C. Ind.
1985); Ford v. U.S., No. SH-C-90-50, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10952 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 8,
1990).
175. Id.
176. The ABA STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES, 121 F.R.D. 101, 115 (1988), recognize
that an attorney's ability to gather reasonable facts is dependent on the client.
Therefore, there are certain factors that will be considered to determine the
reasonableness of an attorney's inquiry that are not relevant to a pro se litigant, who is
not dependent on receiving information from a client.
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depend on when the client sought the attorney's assistance.
For instance, an attorney's ability to research a claim may be
restricted when a client retains an attorney two days before
the relevant statute of limitations runs. These considerations
are unique to the attorney. A pro se litigant is not dependent
on a client or another attorney for sources of information that
may effect the reasonableness of an inquiry.
Thus, such factors naturally make the evaluation of Rule
11 sanctions for attorneys inherently different from that of pro
se litigants. However, the critical consideration in the applica-
tion of a single objective test under Rule 11 is that the inquiry
of reasonableness and improper purpose does not focus on the
subjective element of legal knowledge of the signer. This is
necessary to promote the application of an objective test.
One of the goals of the Advisory Committee was to estab-
lish a rule that set forth an objective test in order to deter
abuse and to streamline the litigation process."' Consideration
of an individual's legal knowledge does not further this goal.
The extent of one's legal knowledge is a subjective considera-
tion that will vary with each pro se litigant. If this factor is
considered, the test under Rule 11 shifts from examining the
reasonableness of the signer's inquiry to evaluating the signer's
knowledge and what the signer "should have known." The
same analysis would also have to be applied to attorneys.
Thus, there would not be a single "reasonable attorney" stan-
dard. Rather, there would be an inquiry into how much expe-
rience or knowledge an attorney has in a particular area (e.g., a
business attorney with thirty years of experience in corporate
law who tries a divorce case for the first time) to determine if
that attorney's actions were reasonable. The evaluation of the
extent of the signer's knowledge, for both attorneys and pro se
litigants, results in a sliding scale for determining if Rule 11
has been violated. This is exactly what the Advisory Commit-
tee sought to avoid when Rule 11 was amended. 17 Rather
than creating more objective criteria and establishing clear
notions of acceptable conduct, the consideration of a pro se liti-
gant's legal knowledge creates a subjective test with less cer-
tain criteria for judging pro se litigants' conduct.
Therefore, the extent of a pro se litigant's legal knowledge
is a proper consideration when determining an appropriate
177. See discussion supra part I.
178. Id.
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Rule 11 sanction. Such an interpretation of Rule 11 is consis-
tent with the goals of the Advisory Committee as expressed in
the note to Rule 11179 and the decisions of the Supreme
Court. 80
Some argue that the application of a single standard to pro
se litigants is nonsensical because while a violation may be
found, no sanctions may apply after considering his or her spe-
cial circumstances.'' Therefore, the argument goes, the special
circumstances should be considered initially when determining
if Rule 11 was violated. However, application of a single stan-
dard furthers an important goal of the Advisory Committee by
establishing standards to which pro se litigants must conform.
When a violation of Rule 11 has been found, the pro se litigant
is essentially on notice that his or her conduct was inappropri-
ate and will not be tolerated again. Even though the judge
may apply a nominal sanction because the party was pro se, a
standard nevertheless has been set." 2 If a pro se litigant's lack
of knowledge is considered at the outset, however, a violation
of Rule 11 may not be found where appropriate, and Rule 11
will not serve its intended deterrent effect.
Thus, in order to promote the goals of the Advisory Com-
mittee and to protect the interests of parties defending against
pro se actions, a single objective test should be applied to any-
one singing a pleading, including a pro se litigant, when deter-
mining if Rule 11 has been violated.
V. CONCLUSION
There are several alternative means of dealing with the
abusive conduct of pro se litigants. Obviously, one means is to
draft a rule that specifically applies to pro se litigants. This
179. See discussion supra part III.A.
180. See discussion supra part III.B.
181. See Nichols, supra note 6.
182. Under the Proposed Amendments, the guiding principle for determining an
appropriate sanction is that "[a] sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be
limited to what is sufficient to deter comparable conduct by persons similarly
situated." PROPOSED AMENDMENT, 137 F.R.D. 53, 77 (1991) (emphasis added).
Monetary sanctions would still be appropriate under the Proposed Amendments, but
the Advisory Committee also recognizes that courts may utilize other sanctions "such
as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure;
requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine
payable to the court; [or] referring the matter to disciplinary authorities." Advisory
Committee Notes, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 137 F.R.D. at 79. Thus, under the
Proposed Amendments, a court may utilize admonitions or reprimands in lieu of
monetary sanctions to notify a pro se litigant that his or her conduct violates Rule 11.
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alternative is necessary if the Advisory Committee did in fact
intend for Rule 11 to be applied differently to pro se litigants
than to attorneys. However, as stated above, a reading of Rule
11 and the Advisory Committee Note does not support this
conclusion.183
Other alternatives that have been posed include requiring
an adverse party to give the litigant notice that Rule 11 sanc-
tions will be pursued.1 The litigant is then given a "safe har-
bor" in that the complaint or pleading may be voluntarily
dismissed or withdrawn without sanctions being applied.
A more feasible alternative utilized by many federal dis-
trict courts today is to establish a special filing system for pro
se complaints. Under this system, the court invests time
researching the legal basis of the pro se litigant's complaint
when it is filed in order to avoid frivolous lawsuits. Service is
then ordered only if the pro se complaint is determined to be
well-grounded in law. This process works well in conjunction
with Rule 11. By initially evaluating the legal basis of the com-
plaint, the potential issues of the reasonableness of the inquiry
into the law underlying the complaint are resolved. The appli-
cation of Rule 11 when applied would then focus on the factual
basis of the claim and the improper purpose, which both
require much less inquiry into the extent of a pro se litigant's
legal knowledge.
Rule 11 can, however, be applied to pro se litigants. The
Supreme Court gives the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a
plain meaning. From a plain reading of Rule 11 and the Advi-
sory Committee Note, it is evident that a single objective test
183. The Proposed Amendments do not include any language differentiating pro
se litigants from attorneys or represented parties. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 137
F.R.D. 53 (1991). In fact, the Advisory Committee recognizes that the proposed Rule
11 "restate[s] the provisions requiring attorneys and pro se litigants to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions,
and other documents, and mandating sanctions for violation of these obligations." I&
at 78.
184. The Proposed Amendments expressly incorporate the "safe harbor" notion
by requiring the following:
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be served separately from other
motions or requests, and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b). It shall not be filed with, or presented to, the court unless the
challenged claim, defense, request, demand, objection, contention, or
argument is not withdrawn or corrrected within 21 days... after service of
the motion.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 137 F.R.D. 53, 76 (1991). Such a safe harbor provision may be
an effective means to notify a pro se litigant that his or her conduct may violate Rule
11 and that continuing the alleged conduct may result in Rule 11 sanctions.
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should be applied to all parties. A single objective test is the
best means of establishing clear objective criteria to guide and
to judge a pro se litigant's conduct and is consistent with the
goal of deterring abusive and frivolous lawsuits. A single
objective test is also needed to protect the interests of parties
opposing pro se litigants. The interests of adverse parties in
terms of financial cost and time expended are often overlooked
in order to protect pro se litigants because of their "special cir-
cumstances." A single objective test, however, can promote
these interests while not infringing on a pro se litigant's access
to the courts.
Pro se status should not be an excuse for failing to con-
form to procedural requirements or for filing frivolous and
vexatious claims. Application of a single objective test under
Rule 11 will guarantee pro se litigants' access to courts, pro-
mote the interests of opposing parties, and protect the integrity
of the judicial system as a means of resolving meaningful
disputes.
